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September 29, 1994 
El Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas ("CATA" or the "Farmworkers Support 
Committee") is a grassroots, membership organization founded by farmworkers in 1979 that uses 
popular education methodology to organize agricultural workers in Puerto Rico, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Mexico. We support workers in their struggle to organize along 
self-determined paths. Occasionally, these paths have lead to support for developing labor 
unions. Often they have lead to involvement in the disputes between workers and their 
employers. , 
The Commission has scheduled this session to deal with the topic of "alternative forms 
of dispute resolution at the workplace and in the application of employment laws." We have 
requested this opportunity to testify in order to express serious reservations about the 
appropriateness of most alternative dispute resolution proposals for agricultural workers. 
In particular, we strongly object to any final Commission recommendation that would 
suggest that federal or state laws creating public rights could be waived or altered by private 
agreements. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations Fact Finding Report, 
May 1994'pp. 116-119, 125-127 (hereinafter referred to as" fcporl)} 
As will be discussed more fully below, the principal federal protective statutes 
affecting farmworkers economic lives on a daily basis are the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §1801 et seq. and the Fair Labor Standards Act 
("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq. The AWPA includes a specific provision guaranteeing that: 
"Agreements by employees purporting to waive or to modify their rights 
under this Act shall be void as contrary to public policy...." 
29 U.S.C. §1856. The Commission has noted the effect of Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight 
System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981) on the non-waiver of rights under the FLSA. Report, p. 116. 
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Similarly, it is our experience that "Ombudsman" systems as applied to the agricultural 
workplace, are only new and more sophisticated control mechanisms for agricultural employers, 
rather than positive humanistic developments that should be supported and encouraged. We 
believe that the Commission should express significant reservations about such systems in the 
context of unorganized workers. See fieport^. 119-121. 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 
Any evaluation of the merits of alternative dispute resolution procedures for agricultural 
workers can only occur against the backdrop of the historical imbalance of power between 
agricultural employers and their employees. It is for that reason it is critical to understand the 
nature of the relationship between farmworkers and their employers and farm labor contractors 
before discussing proposals for alternative dispute resolution. 
Farmworker organizations and advocates do not uniformly reject all forms of voluntary 
alternative dispute resolution, but we would vehemently reject any proposal for changes in law 
guaranteeing farmworkers full and appropriate access to federal courts.2 This must include the 
right to immediate access to federal courts for appropriate injunctive remedies under the AWPA. 
Legal Services programs representing farmworkers in Pennsylvania and in North 
Carolina, amongst others, have explored some forms of voluntary alternative dispute resolution 
with at best mixed results. However, such voluntaiy exploration of appropriate alternative dispute 
resolution approaches is far different from any mandate from this Commission or federal law that 
such approaches must be employed. 
The AWPA already includes provisions permitting attempts to resolve matters before 
commencing litigation in court as an element to consider in the amount of statutory damages to 
be assessed. 29 U.S.C. §1854(c)(2). This is a more than sufficient incentive to encourage 
development of appropriate voluntaiy alternative dispute resolution procedures. 
Changes in federal law which would prevent farmworkers from pursuing claims (including 
claims for injunctive relief) under the AWPA until exhaustion of administrative remedies or 
alternative dispute mechanisms have been vigorously opposed by farmworker advocates. See, 
Hearings July 13 , 1987 before the Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the House Committee 
on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 1st Session (Serial No. 100-
50) and in particular testimony of Arthur N. Read. Effective injunctive remedies for violations 
of the AWPA are a key and important aspect of the legal framework for protection of 
farmworker's rights. 
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Status of Protection for the Rights of Agricultural Workers 
U.S. Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich stated in reference to the May 1994 draft fteporM 
this Commission: 
"The American Workplace has undergone extraordinary transformations 
over the last six decades and will be evolving still more dramatically in the 
future, but our legal framework and many of our notions about worker-
management relations were made for a 1930's world - - not the 21st century."3 
Unfortunately, for most farmworkers in this country labor relations have not yet evolved to the 
level of labor rights of most other workers in the 1930's. The "enlightened" search for a 21st 
century approach to labor relations must not ignore the unintended effects of such changes on 
the nation's agricultural work force. 
Federal law continues to deprive agricultural workers of the same federally protected 
rights to engage in concerted protected activities, to engage in self-organization, and to compel 
employers to recognize unions selected by a majority of workers at a workplace that virtually 
every other category of worker receives at least on a theoretical basis.4 
The federal Commission on Agricultural Workers in November 1992 found that: 
"Farmworkers face special problems if they attempt to organize and 
bargain collectively in order to improve their working conditions. Effective 
3
 USDL News Release 94-277, June 2, 1994. 
29 U.S.C. §152(3) defines an employee protected under the National Labor 
Relations Act as excluding "...any individual employed as an agricultural laborer...." See, 
discussion of legislative history by the Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report, p. 14-15 (November 1992). 
The exclusion of mushroom workers and other indoor workers in horticultural specialties 
from protection under the National Labor Relations Act is only the result of appropriations riders 
to the National Labor Relations Act beginning in 1946 which required the NLRB to utilize the 
Fair Labor Standards Act definition of agricultural workers. See, Michigan Mushroom Co., 90 
NLRB 119, 26 LRRM 1279 (1950) holding that a 1946 appropriate rider required the NLRB to 
utilize the Fair Labor Standards definition of agriculture and that therefore mushroom workers 
had no protected rights under the NLRA. Prior to 1946 such wo/kers had protected rights under 
the NLRA. Compare: Matter of Park Floral Company, 10 NLRB 404 (1940) (cultivation of 
horticultural specialties under artificial conditions not agricultural labor exempt under the NLRA); 
Great Western Mushroom Company, 27 NLRB 352 (1940) (mushroom harvesting laborers not 
agricultural labor exempt under the NLRA); Knaust Brothers, Inc., 36 NLRB 915 (1941); 
Indiana Mushroom Company, 60 NLRB 1064 (1945); Matter of Pepeekeo Sugar Company, 59 
NLRB 1532 (1945). 
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organizing is made more difficult by the fact that farmworkers are essentially 
powerless, both in objective terms and relative to the agricultural employers who 
oppose organizing. The powerlessness is compounded by the explicit exclusion of 
agricultural employees from legislation designed to afford U.S. workers this basic 
right."5 
The Commission on Agricultural Workers adopted as one of its final recommendations that: 
"Farmworkers should be afforded the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, with appropriate protection provided to all parties."6 
The nature of the political power of agricultural employers is that such a recommendation is 
unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable future. 
CATA has been active in New Jersey and Puerto Rico where local constitutional protection 
recognize the rights of agricultural workers to organize unions and engage in collective 
bargaining. Similarly, in Pennsylvania such protection have been recognized as applying to the 
mushroom industry where CATA has been active, although other agricultural workers have no 
such protection. 
Unfortunately, even labor laws theoretically protecting rights to organize with weak and 
ineffective remedies are incapable by themselves of changing the basic power relationship 
between agricultural employers and their workers. The Commission on Agricultural Workers 
concluded in analyzing the status of union activity amongst farmworkers: 
"Underlying all these issues, however, is the labor supply. When actual or 
potential strikers, or even workers deemed to be 'trouble-makers,' can be 
replaced easily, the likelihood of successful organizing declines. Occupations with 
few entry requirements and many available workers are always difficult to 
organize. This has been the case with agricultural field work in recent years."7 
The largest numbers of hired farmworkers are employed in fruit, vegetable and 
horticultural ("FVH") operations. The Commission on Agricultural Workers in November 1992 
observed: 
v 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural 
Workers, Report, p. 136 and Executive Summary, p. 11 (November 1992). 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Chapter IX Recommendations (November 
1992). Id 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural 
Workers, Report, p. 112 (November 1992). 
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"The business of growing FVH products has changed dramatically over the 
past few decades. The number of small entrepreneurs running independent 
farming operations has shrunk. And while the majority of FVH farms continue to 
be classified as small, family-run operations, large, corporate agri-businesses 
have increased their domination of the industry, accounting for the majority of 
acreage and production and employing most of the farmworkers. 
"At the same time, the industry itself is becoming vertically integrated. 
Packing houses and processing companies coordinate and control decisions 
ranging from the crop variety and timing of the planting to the final price a 
grower will receive. As a result, these larger farms and a maze of corporate 
structure, government agencies, financial institutions, and attorneys shape 
individual growers' business decisions."8 
The Commission on Agricultural Workers found that the predominate role of government 
in relationship to American agriculture has been "to promote and protect agriculture."9 The 
Commission on Agricultural Workers noted: 
"Farming, farmers, and farmworkers, however, have been granted a special 
status. This status has been based on the premise that U.S. agriculture, 
consisting largely of family farms, is as much a way of life as a business. 
However, only a few segments of the agricultural industry today exhibit a 
structure and organization that differs markedly from that of other .businesses. 
This is particularly true in the case of fruit, vegetable and horticultural 
production."10 
The Commission on Agricultural Workers estimated that there are approximately 2.5 
million hired agricultural workers in the United States. In terms of ethnic composition of that 
workforce, the Commission on Agricultural Workers concluded: 
"A large majority of seasonal farmworkers in the United States are of Latin 
origin. A smaller proportion, though still a majority, are foreign-born. The NAWS 
["National Agricultural Worker Survey"] refers to the process by which this has 
occurred as the "latinization" of the farm labor force. In 1990, 70 percent of all 
SAS ["seasonal agricultural service"] workers were foreign-born; 51 per cent of 
those were SAWs ["Special Agricultural Workers"]. In more recently established 
immigrant-receiving areas, primarily the midwest (excluding Texas) and the East 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural 
Workers, Report, pp. 2-3 (November 1992). 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural 
Workers, Report, p. 26 (November 1992). 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural 
Workers, Report, p. 26 (November 1992). 
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(excluding Florida), only 36 percent of the SAS work force was foreign born; 45 
percent of those were SAW's. Although there are fewer immigrant and Latino 
farmworkers in the new receiving areas, workers there are younger and more 
likely to be post-IRCA (unauthorized) immigrants than in the established areas."11 
CATA has been principally active in the East Coast of the United States, where the labor 
force has become increasingly composed of Mexican born nationals, a large percentage of whom 
are undocumented. The Commission on Agricultural Workers found: 
"Until very recently, east coast agriculture had relied on its own sources 
of farm labor. For example, European immigrants in the 1920s, were employed 
extensively in New Jersey truck farming, while Appalachian whites were recruited 
for the New York apple harvest, and southern born African-Americans made up 
the bulk of the farm labor force in Delaware and Maryland. Puerto Rican workers 
replaced many of these groups. 
"The large-scale dispersion of Mexican-born workers into eastern U.S. 
labor markets did not begin until the 1960's. While there were influxes of Haitian 
workers in the early 1980s and Guatemalan workers in the mid-1980s, by the end 
of that decade, Mexicans had become the largest single immigrant group in South 
Florida as well as throughout much of the East Coast."12 
In addition, to the increasing participation of Mexican nationals in the labor force 
throughout the northeastern United States, this region has also developed significant local labor 
forces of Southeast Asian refugees performing agricultural labor, principally from the 
Cambodian, Vietnamese and Laotian communities especially in the Philadelphia and New York 
City areas. Many agricultural employers continue to consciously utilize workers from different 
ethnic communities, particularly with linguistic barriers between them, in order to prevent 
collective actions by the work force.13 
As noted by the Commission on Agricultural Workers a significant percentage of the 
foreign-born work force in the Eastern United States consists of undocumented ("unauthorized") 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural 
Workers, Report, p. 73 (November 1992). 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural 
Workers, Report, p. 44 (November 1992). 
For example, in 1993 in a strike in the Pennsylvania mushroom industry against 
an employ tii with a predominately Mexican workforce, the employer recruited farm labor 
contractors from the Cambodian and Vietnamese communities to supply replacement workers. 
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immigrants.14 It is expected that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will increase 
the number of undocumented Mexican nationals in the labor force. The Commission on 
Agricultural Workers reported that: 
"While economic development efforts can in the long run, decrease migrant 
flows, the immediate impact is likely to be the further stimulation of migration 
out of rural, peasant villages into labor demand areas, wherever those may be. 
Implementation of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will likely 
have just that impact. While NAFTA ultimately may decrease migration pressures 
from Mexico, the immediate impact is likely to be one of increased population 
movement out of rural villages, continued overcrowding in Mexico's cities, and 
further "stage migration" - - first to areas of economic growth in northern 
Mexico and then into the United States."15 
One of the results of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, has been that 
undocumented workers are afraid to assert their legal rights to even such things as minimum 
wages or housing provided by employers or farm labor contractors which meets minimum 
standards for habitability. Some employers are clearly aware that their workforce includes such 
undocumented foreign-born workers and consciously exploit the vulnerability of that 
workforce.16 
Farm labor contractors continue to play a uniquely important role in the recruitment 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural 
Workers, Report, p. 73 (November 1992). 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural 
Workers, Report, p. 86 (November 1992). 
16
 The Immigration and Naturalization service in 1979 had proposed to amend its 
operating instructions to specifically recognize the rights of persons pursuing legal claims to 
remain in the United States as a litigant pending the outcome of those claims. These changes 
were never formalized. It would be critical for the Department of Labor to establish procedures 
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service for undocumented workers whose legal rights 
have been violated to obtain employment authorization and be placed under voluntary departure 
status ("docket control") while such persons pursued their legal rights. Numerous court decisions 
have recognized that such undocumented workers must have the right to pursue claims under 
protective statutes. See: In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, Griffin & Brand 
ofMcAllen, Inc. v. Reyes, 487 U.S. 1235 (1988) ("AWPA protection apply to both documented 
and undocumented workers"); Patel v. Quality Inn South,. 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988), cert, 
denied, 489 U.S. 1011 (1989) (FLSA rights available to undocumented employees). However, 
as a practical matter undocumented workers place themselves at risk to deportation (or 
prosecution for use of false documents) if they pursue such claims. 
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and provision of much of the agricultural labor force throughout the Eastern United States. 
These "middlemen" have long been blamed for some of the most gross abuses'of farmworkers, 
including situations in which workers have been held in peonage or slavery. Indeed, in some 
areas of the Eastern United States the changing sources of labor supply have increased the role 
of farm labor contractors in the recruitment and provision of labor. Farmworkers supplied 
through farm labor contractors may have to fear not only economic reprisals for assertion of 
employment rights, but may have to fear physical reprisals as well. 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF LEGAL CLAIMS 
1. Basis for Refusing to Allowing Waiver of Publicly Created Rights 
The May 1994 draft Beporto\ this Commission appears to come dangerously close to 
suggesting that the well established public policy and legal precedents that laws creating public 
rights could not be waived or altered by private agreement should be reconsidered.17 This would 
be disastrous in the context of agricultural workers and other unorganized low-paid workers. 
As was noted above the principal federal protective statutes affecting farmworkers 
economic lives on a daily basis are the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §1801 etseg.and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §201 etseq. 
Each of which has been explicitly recognizing as barring waiver of rights thereunder by 
employees. In addition, farmworkers are affected by statutes relating to employment 
discrimination and to health and safety in the workplace. 
The United States Supreme Court in the context of the FLSA minimum wage protection 
stated in 1945: 
"It has been held in this and other courts that a statutory right conferred 
on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or 
released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy....Where a 
private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate a legislative policy, 
The Report, at pp. 117-118, appears to suggest that the narrow holding in Gilmer 
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) should be given greater scope. As the 
Commission appropriately notes (footnote 16, page 117), Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
supra, involved arbitration of claims of a registered securities representative under a registration 
agreement with the New York stock exchange. The level of imbalance in the power relationship 
between "master" and "servant" inherent in the position of such a relatively well off and 
privileged employee, simply cannot be compared to the power relationship between an 
agricultural employee and his, or her, employer or farm labor contractor. 
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waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public interest will not be allowed 
where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate.18 
"The legislative debates indicate that the prime purpose of the legislation 
was to aid the unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of the nation's working 
population; that is those employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power to 
secure for themselves a minimum subsistence wage.19 
* * # 
"Moreover, the same policy which forbids employee waiver of the minimum 
statutory rate because of inequality of bargaining power, prohibits these same 
employees from bargaining with their employer in determining whether so little 
damage was suffered that waiver of liquidated damages is called for."20 
That same inequality of bargaining power continues unabated for agricultural workers 
throughout the nation and is reflected in the 1983 Congressional enactment of the Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA") which contains explicit Congressional 
language barring "agreements purporting to waive or modify rights under this Act...."21 
No system of employer mandated arbitration included within employment agreements of 
unorganized workers could ever reliably protect the publicly created rights of farmworkers.22 
See, Brooklyn Savings Bank v. ONeil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945). 
19
 Id at 707, fn. 18 
20
 Id at 708 
21
 29 U.S.C. §1856 
The Report, at page 118, acknowledges: 
"A crucial fact, of course, is that it is the employer that unilaterally 
develops the arbitration procedures that (nonunion) employees are contractually 
bound to use. That means that important quality standards should be met by such 
a private procedure before it may be enforced against a plaintiff with a public law 
claim. As the Supreme Court in acknowledged in Gilmer, if Congress or the 
courts have decided that it is in the public interest to guarantee employees certain 
fundamental rights, this policy judgement [sic] must not be evaded or diluted 
through private procedures that cannot fairly and effectively address employee 
claims that their rights have been violated." 
Such due process judicial standards clearly exist in court proceedings, but no effective 
guarantee of them can be provided in private proceedings involving agricultural workers. Many 
agricultural workers do not speak English as their principal language and may not be fully literate 
(continued...) 
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Moreover, absent equality of bargaining power between parties agreeing to arbitration of disputes 
other issues raised by the Commission should bar deferral to employer created arbitration 
procedures for any low-income workers including agricultural workers.23 
(...continued) 
and educated in any language. Statutes such as FLSA and Title VII explicitly include provisions 
for attorney's fees for counsel in recognition of the fact that the amounts involved in such claims 
do not make it possible for private litigants to obtain assistance of competent counsel without 
such attorney's fees. 
See, Report, p. 119. Selection of arbitrators in the context of union and 
management labor arbitration is a process in which the economic strength of the union (or its 
attorneys) in decisions to refuse to make further use of arbitrators who are unfair to union 
grievance claims, acts as an effective policing mechanism on unfair and arbitrary decisions by 
such an arbitrator. No similar system, absent preserving findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of a private arbitrator for full plenary judicial review, could ever exist in the context of persons 
of unequal bargaining power. Indeed, it is one of the reasons why arbitration may be flawed for 
any claimant whose claim is not aggressively and actively supported by their union, even if, in 
satisfaction of its perceived duty of fair representation, the union provides a arbitration hearing 
for a claimant. v 
Low income persons could never effectively bear the costs of private arbitration (or even 
mediation) of claims. Due process might instead require the employer to provide effective 
counsel (and translation) for low income workers with claims, like minimum wage claims, for 
which attorney's fees are, and should be, available as a matter of law. Having employers bear 
the full costs of an arbitration system, further increases the non-neutrality of the process since 
all economic incentives for the arbitrator or arbitration service are not to destroy the goose that 
laid the golden egg. 
Arbitration procedures which do not include the rights to discovery, depositions and 
subpoenas are another fundamental flaw of many arbitration (and mediation) procedures. Most 
private arbitration systems (unlike mediation arrangements) have procedures for subpoenas to be 
issued, but, particularly in the context of migrant farm workers and disputes with farm labor 
contractors and employers, the multi-state nature of the disputes involved make availability of 
full judicial discovery procedures critical. 
Experience of farmworkers in Pennsylvania with alternative dispute resolution mediation 
procedures since 1987 has explicitly demonstrated that the absence of procedures to compel 
discovery of relevant information fundamentally flaws the efficacy of such proceedings. 
No privately mandated arbitration provision not agreed to by parties without equal 
bargaining power should deprive the party not in control of the system (here the farmworker) of 
the right to file appropriate legal proceedings. Some alternative dispute resolution specialists 
have suggested exploration of such one-way binding arbitration proceedings. Limited voluntary 
exploration of such one-way binding procedures which do not deprive farmworkers of immediate 
access to courts in appropriate circumstances might be appropriate. 
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2. Alternative Dispute Resolution of Legal Rights of Farmworkers 
a. The Glassboro Puerto Rican Contract 
In 1980 the New Jersey Supreme Court eloquently analyzed the relative inequality of 
bargaining power of an agricultural employer and its employees. The Court refused to enforce 
contractual provisions in the written employment contracts of thousands of Puerto Rican 
agricultural workers in New Jersey. The Court held that unfair terms in such contracts should 
be viewed as contracts of adhesion and treated like unfair consumer contracts between 
uneducated consumers and large corporations.24 
See, Vasquez v. Glassboro Services Association, 83 N.J. 86, 415 A.2d 1156 
(1980). The Court there stated: 
"A basic tenet of the law of contracts is that courts should enforce 
contracts made by the parties. However, application of that principle assumes that 
the parties are in position of relative equality and that their consent is freely given. 
See, Henningsen v. BloomfieldMotors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386 (1960). In recent 
years, courts have become increasingly sensitive to overreaching in contracts 
where there is an inequality in the status of the parties.... 
* * * v 
"A migrant farmworker has even less bargaining power than a residential 
tenant. 
* * * 
"The status of a worker seeking employment with Glassboro is analogous 
to that of a consumer who must accept a standardized form contract to purchase 
needed goods and services. Neither farmworkers nor consumers negotiate the 
terms of their contracts; both must accept the contracts as presented to them. In 
both instances, the contracts affect many people as well as the public interest. 
"With respect to a standardized form contract, the intention of the 
consumer has been described as "but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms 
dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often understood 
only in vague way, if at all.' Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts 
About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 632 (1943). After noting the 
"gross inequality of bargaining position' between the parties in Henningsen, supra. 
32 N.J. at 391, this Court stated that no meaningful consent had been given by the 
consumer to the terms of the contract. A contract one of where one party, as here, 
must accept or reject the contract doe not result from the consent of that party. 
Id at 390. It is a contract of adhesion: 
' There being no private consent to support a contract of adhesion, 
its legitimacy rests entirely on its compliance with standards in the 
public interest. The individual who is subject to the obligations 
(continued...) 
Corrected Testimony, September 29 J994 Page J J 
In the period after World War 11. Puerto Rican workers were a principal element of the 
labor force in the Eastern United States, especially in New Jersey. Between 1948 and 1990, 
427,604 Puerto Rican farmworkers were contracted for jobs in the United States, while additional 
thousands came without the benefits of government sanctioned work agreements.25 Agricultural 
employers who complied with Puerto Rico's laws were required to sign employment contracts 
negotiated through the Puerto Rico Department of Labor. 
Jn New Jersey an organization named Glassboro Services Association signed such 
employment contracts on behalf of its more than 500 members growers. These contracts 
contained nominal grievance provisions which in reality provided no protection to Puerto Rican 
workers who attempted to avail themselves of rights under the "Puerto Rican contract." 
However, the dependence of the Puerto Rican economy on such off-island migration left even 
the Puerto Rico Department of Labor as a paper tiger in attempting to enforce contract rights. 
The findings of fact in the grievance procedure simply involved Glassboro Service Association 
employer representatives writing their version of what occurred.26 The grievance provisions of 
24(... continued) 
imposed by a standard form thus gains the assurance that the rules 
to which he is subject have received his consent either directly or 
through their conforming to the higher public laws and standards 
made and enforced by the public institutions that legitimately 
govern him. [Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic 
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 566 (1971)].'" 
Vasquez v. Glassboro Services Association, 83 N.J. at 101-104. 
Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural 
Workers, Report, p. 20 (November 1992). 
In its discussion of the facts in the case of the plaintiff in Vasquez v. Glassboro 
Services A ssociation, supra, (which involved a dispute over the summary self-help eviction of 
a farmworker from housing without any due process), the New Jersey Supreme Court stated as 
to the contractual grievance situation: 
"The contract provided that, if an employee was to be discharged, a hearing 
was to occur no later than five days after the employee was given notice of 
termination. The contract did not require a minimum amount of time to elapse 
between notice and termination of employment. 
"The contract further provided for administrative review within the Puerto 
(continued...) 
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the contracts, however, provided Glassboro Services Association with a shield against attempts 
to enforce contractual provisions by workers who had not exhausted their contractual grievance 
procedures.27 
Moreover, far from encouraging resolution of individual meritorious claims Glassboro 
Service Association taxed its members thousands of dollars each year for a legal defense fund 
that was used to fight virtually every legal claim filed by a Puerto Rican contract worker. In 
1978, Puerto Rican contract workers employed the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act 
("FLCRA")28, on a classwide basis to force Glassboro Service Association to comply with aspects 
of the Puerto Rican contract which they had refused to comply with.29 
The Puerto Rican contract experience demonstrates the absurdity for economically 
powerless farmworkers in relying upon a grievance system which is controlled by an 
(...continued) 
Rican Department of Labor whenever a worker had a complaint 'regarding the 
breach, application, interpretation or compliance' with the contract. If the 
Secretary of Labor determined that Glassboro had 'not adequately remedied the 
complaint,' the Secretary could represent the worker and sue Glassboro. 
* * * 
"According to Glassboro's foreman, Vasquez's work was not satisfactory. 
On July 19, 1976, the foreman told Vasquez that he was to be discharged. A few 
hours later Vasquez had his 'hearing' with the foreman and a field representative 
of the Puerto Rican Department of Labor. Thereafter the foreman decided to 
complete the discharge...." 
Vasquez v. Glassboro Services Association, 83 N.J. at 97-98. 
Attempts in New Jersey state courts to enforce rights of Puerto Rican migrant 
workers on a classwide basis for common violations of contract were rejected in part because of 
a requirement to demonstrate individual exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
7 U.S.C. §2041 et seq. This statute was the predecessor of the current Migrant 
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §1801 et seq. which was 
enacted effective April 14, 1983. 
Pachecho et al. vs. New Jersey Farm Bureau et al, U.S. District Court, District of 
New Jersey, Civil No. 78-2763. 
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economically powerful agricultural employer. Grievance arbitration procedures under collective 
bargaining agreements have very different roles and functions that are related to the collective 
strength of a union. We can envision no circumstances under which surrendering public rights 
to a binding grievance or arbitration process would be in the interest of agricultural workers.30 
b. The Inadequacy of Government Agencies and Remedies 
No effective alternative protection can exist for farmworkers in government administered 
agencies created to intervene in the disputes between farmworkers and their employers. These 
administrative agencies have uniformly failed, because of the greater economic weight and power 
of the agricultural community in the political sphere. Absence self-organization and 
empowerment of farmworkers, the United States Employment Service System and its Regional 
and State Monitor Advocates will continue to be ineffective agencies that only continue their 
historical roles of deference to the need of agricultural providers.3' 
c. Mediation in Pennsylvania 
The Pennsylvania legal services program for migrant farmworkers, Friends of 
Farmworkers, Inc., has several years worth of experience with an alternative dispute resolution 
mediation program for migrant farmworkers in the tomato harvesting region of northeastern 
Pennsylvania. Considerable effort was expended in the structuring of a formal mediation 
The Commission's Report, at pp. 113-114, notes that alternative dispute resolution 
procedures must include: (i) necessary due process procedures; (ii) neutrals with sufficient 
substantive expertise to warrant deference to their decisions by the public agencies and courts 
responsible for the laws involved. Unfortunately, this last category is one of the areas where 
arbitration of employment disputes between farmworkers and their employers is likely to be 
singularly deficient. There simply is not a body of neutrals with knowledge and experience in 
the areas of farmworker rights covered by laws, such as the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §1801. Moreover, the existing administrative 
enforcement mechanisms of the United States Department of Labor (which provide no remedies 
for injured workers) are far slower than the judicial system. 
31
 As an example, a local job service representative in Pennsylvania testified that 
in conducting inspections of a farm labor camp he lied about the dimensions of rooms so as 
to allow the number of persons who had been permitted under state issued farm labor camp 
permits to continue to live in such quarters. There has been extensive litigation over the 
failures of the United States Employment Service system over the last 20 years. 
Page J4 Corrected Testimony. September 29, 1994 
program involving law school professors. However, experience with that program does not 
suggest that it is appropriate as a larger scale mandatory model.32 
Amongst the troubling experiences reported by farmworkers who attempted to utilize the 
Pennsylvania mediation program were instances of physical retaliation by persons believed to 
be connected with farm labor contractors against workers who attempted to assert rights under 
the in-season dispute resolution aspects of the program. 
To the extent that the experience with the Pennsylvania mediation system can provide 
more general guidelines it continues to be that the only successes of the mediation system to 
date have been in a context where the power of farmworkers lays in the strength of their 
alternative legal remedies in court. It does not provide any effective alternative to readily 
available legal remedies for farmworkers. 
2. OMBUDSMEN 
Farmworkers in states where CATA is active have had extensive experience with various 
"ombudsmen" programs. We cannot join the Commission in expressing even cautious optimism 
about the positive potential for such systems in the context of agricultural workers. 
A good "ombudsmen" performs no more effective task than a good personnel office in a 
large business. This is not a major positive development for alternative dispute resolution at 
least as it has developed in our experience. 
Unfortunately, in the context of the powerlessness of farmworkers in relationship to their 
employers and farm labor contractors, "ombudsmen" in our experience are often only a further 
means of control of farmworkers. Such "ombudsmen" are frequently explicitly intended to 
prevent farmworkers from engaging in the kind of self-organization that is fundamental to 
changing the nature of the power relationship between farmworkers and their employers. 
Farmworkers must be protected from persons who deceive them with claims of 
independence from their employers, but who, in fact, are nothing more than agents paid by and 
acting in the interest of the employers. 
Interestingly, although agricultural employers in Pennsylvania and other states have 
long insisted that they are interested in alternative dispute resolution, no farmers outside of six 
large growers in a two county area have expressed any interest in applying the mediation of 
dispute model to disputes in other areas of the state involving larger numbers of farmworkers. 
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Farmworkers have reported: (1) being pressured by "ombudsmen" to refrain from 
pursuing criminal assault or disorderly conduct charges against farm labor contractors who have 
assaulted them at work on the job; (2) being told by "ombudsmen" that God would not want 
them to pursue claims against their employers or farm labor contractors; (3) threatened with 
retaliation for pursuing claims against their employers; (4) being recruited to work as strike 
breakers during a labor dispute by "ombudsmen" working for groups of mushroom growers. 
Moreover, "ombudsmen" working for multiple employers offer sophisticated opportunities for 
systematic "blacklisting" of workers who are perceived trouble makers.33 
"Ombudsmen" are also involved in the development of worker committees at workplaces 
where union organizing has occurred in order to discourage and undercut collective action and 
organization by workers. 
We would strongly urge the Commission to refrain from any generalized endorsement of 
so-called "ombudsmen" systems. 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that the Commission should refrain from endorsing fprms of alternative 
dispute resolution as mandatory alternatives to judicial enforcement of publicly created 
statutory rights. 
We believe that the Commission should recognize that farmworkers must be empowered 
and engage in collective actions in order to change the imbalance of the power relationships 
between themselves and their employers. This should be the appropriate focus for Commission 
recommendations affecting such unorganized workers. 
The Commission should not endorse proposals for alternative dispute resolution that will 
further undermine opportunities for self^organization of unorganized workers. 
Some "ombudsmen" have been involved in the development of job applicant 
questionnaires intended to identify relatives who may have been involved in labor disputes or 
complaints at other operations. 
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